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ROBERT E. COVINGTON
Attorney at Law
8884 North Government Way, Suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
Tel. 208-762-4545
Fax 208-762-4546
ISB#2312

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIAN B. BAKEER, TRUSTEE OF
THE MARIAN B. BAKER TRUST,
Dated May 12, 2013,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

vs.
KAL, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability
Company,
Defendant/Counterclaimants/
Cross Claimants/Appellants,
~d
JOHN STADLER and VICKIE
STADLER, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/
Cross Claimants/Appellants,
and
JOSEI.MELENDRERASand
JACQUELINE Z. MELENDRERAS,
Husband and wife,
Defendants/Cross Defendants/
Respondents.
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SUPREME COURT NO. 44855

DC NO. CV-15-1484

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Comes now KAL,LLC, the Defendant/Appellant in the above matter, by and
through its attorney, Robert Covington, to submit its reply brief.
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INTRODUCTION
The issues presented in this appeal are simple. The errors of the trial court are
plain. The brief filed by the Respondent, hereinafter "Baker," reiterates the rationale
offered by the trial court, avoids clear and relevant precedent and argues for an unjust
result. The Appellant, hereinafter KAL, urges the Court to reverse the decision of the
trial court, determine that the deed in question is unambiguous and does not grant to
Baker's predecessor in interest an express easement for ingress and egress over that
portion of Alexana Lane that traverses KAL's parcel, Tract 9, and remand this matter
for further proceedings.
A. THE DEED IS UNAMBIGUOUS
In its initial brief in this appeal, KAL cited the Court to recent and compelling
precedent on the issue of determining whether a deed is ambiguous. Camp Easton
Forever, Inc. v. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 156 Idaho 893, 332
P.3d 805 (2014). The Court there held that a deed is ambiguous when it is reasonably
subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. at p. 900. Neither the trial court nor Baker
has applied this test within this proceeding. When the Camp Easton test is applied to
the deed that is in question in this matter, the decision must be that the deed is
unambiguous.
As pointed out on page 7 of Appellant's Brief, the trial court said that a literal
reading of the word "reserving" created an "absurdity" in that Timberland was
reserving to itself an easement through land it already owned. T. June 29, 2016, p. 13, l.
22. Baker makes the same argument as the trial court. Both are incorrect in that the
use of the word reserving in the Timberland deed never purports to reserve an
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easement over land it would own after the completion of the transaction with
Melendreras.
Baker points to use of the word reserving in reference to Parcel 1 of the
conveyance to Melendreras wherein Timberland reserved therefrom "that portion" of
the road that is described in Exhibit B that crossed Parcel 1. Baker ignores the "that
portion" of the reservation to argue that the reservation applied to the whole of the
road described in Exhibit B. Baker argues that since you cannot reserve an easement
across your own property, "reserving" is ambiguous in the Timberland deed. The
Court can no doubt plainly understand that the "that portion" modifier of reserving
literally means that the reservation did not apply to the whole of the road described in
Exhibit B. It should be noted that reserving is used a second time in the Parcel 1
conveyance/description in a manner consistent with the initial use. No second
reasonable interpretation of the meaning of reserving is offered by Baker or the trial
court with respect to two instances in Parcel 1. For that matter, there is no "absurdity"
in either reservation.
Reserving is used once in reference to Parcel 2 of the Timberland conveyance to
Melendreras. In that instance Timberland reserved an easement over a strip of land
sixty feet in width paralleling the north boundary of Parcel 2. Neither did the trial
court reason nor Baker argue that that use of "reserving" has multiple reasonable
interpretations in this instance. KAL submits that the trial court may have misread the
"TOGETHER WITH" paragraph referencing Parcel 2 to conclude that Timberland
was granting to itself an easement over land it continued to own after the Melendreras
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transaction. That language plainly grants to Melendreras an easement over a portion
of Tract 9. Baker acknowledges as much in its brief at page 15 thereof.

B. ERROR TO CREATE NEW EASEMENT NOT WITHIN MEANING OF
THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEED
In the absence of multiple conflicting reasonable interpretations, the
Timberland to Melendreras deed must be held to be unambiguous. Because the deed is
unambiguous, it was further error for the trial court to look outside the deed to render
its judgment regarding the intent of the parties and then create a new easement for
Melendreras.
However, if the deed is unambiguous, the merger doctrine applies. The merger
doctrine merges a prior contract into a deed when the deed is delivered and
accepted as performance of conveyance contract. Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90
Idaho 373,382,414 P.2d 879,884 (1966). Even when a deed's terms vary from
an earlier contract, courts must look to the deed alone to determine parties'
rights. Id. Thus, an unambiguous deed forecloses considering another
agreement, including the Minutes. Accordingly, this case comes down to one
question, whether the deed is ambiguous.
Camp Easton at page 899. After considering oral extrinsic evidence the trial court
concluded that "Timberland intended to grant an easement to Melendreras to cross
Tracts 5,6,11, 10 and 9 all the way into Tract 8 and in the same document to reserve
itself-to itself an easement to cross Sections 7 and 8 that it had just sold to the
Melendrerases. Therefore, this Court finds specific that Melendrerases specifically and
expressly granted to plaintiff the easement rights that it had received from
Timberlake--Timberland. I keep saying Timberlake; it's Timberland." T. June 29,
2016, p. 8, II. 3-12. By granting to Baker an easement across Tract 9, the trial court
did not select from one of multiple reasonable interpretations of the language of the
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deed as required by Camp Easton. Rather, the trial court inserted a new term into the
1999 Timberland to Melendreras deed. No reasonable person looking at the 1999
Timberland to Melendreras deed could find in the language any reasonable
interpretation that created an easement for Melendreras along the road across Tracts 9
and 10. In essence, the trial court modified the Timberland/Melendreras 1999 deed by
inserting a new term long after the statute of limitations had run on any claim by
Melendreras against Timberland for breach of contract. The creation of such an
easement by the trial court was erroneous and should be reversed.
C. NO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL TO BAKER
Baker has asserted a claim for attorney fees on appeal on the false premises that
there was no proper appeal and that KAL has no right to present argument on the
ambiguity of the deed in question to the Court. The initial issue was resolved
previously by the Court and the appeal reinstated. As to the second issue, the Court
exercises free review of the question of law that is at the heart of this matter. Baker
claims that no authority nor analysis of the ambiguity issue has been presented to this
Court. That is simply false and absurd. Camp Easton is significant authority in
support of the contentions of KAL. That Baker has ignored Camp Easton is incredible.
No attorney fees as sought by Baker should be awarded.

CONCLUSION
This case presents a classic example of claims that raise the public policy
considerations underlying the Statute of Frauds, the prohibition of extrinsic evidence
when contracts or deeds are clear and unambiguous on their face and statutes of
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limitations. The principal events in this case occurred seventeen years ago. Jerry
Mortensen, the person who signed the Timberland deed is dead. More than five years
have elapsed since 1999 and with the passage of time, the right of Melendreras to assert
against Timberland or Mortensen that Timberland failed to deliver an easement
allegedly promised in 1999. The record in this case contains no writing other than the
deed that was signed by Timberland. Melendreras claimed that their lender required
the easement they seek in this case but there is no corroborating evidence and the deed
itself plainly does not contain such a grant. KAL bought its property in 2002. The
recorded Timberland deed to Melendreras contains no notice to KAL of an express
easement in favor of Melendreras over the logging road as it existed in 2002.
Whether the facts and our law support an easement implied from prior use or a
statutory easement in this case is not known as those issues have not been fully tried.
The Timberland deed does make it clear that there should be no express easement such
as created by the trial court. The trial court's decision on ambiguity should be
reversed, the deed determined to be unambiguous and interpreted to say that there is
no express easement in favor of Baker over those portions of the road in Tract 9 that
are described in Exhibit B to the deed. The case should then be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.

Dated this 23rd day of October, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of October, 2017, I caused to be
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facsimile
transmission to:

William A. Fuhrman
Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, Gourley
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: 208-331-1529
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